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would allow the dealer to be sued in the Montana courts, even though
the sale technically resulted "in accrual within this state of a tort
action.'5 7
It is submitted that the instant case, being the single construction
of the Montana long arm tort liability statute, is in accord with nation-
wide authority and sets a favorable precedent for Montana courts. Re-
stricting jurisdiction to the physical boundaries of the state, while mod-
ern corporations distribute their products nationally, hampers an injured
plaintiff in obtaining redress. Typically, the relevant evidence and wit-
nesses will be located in the state in which the injury occurs. Requiring
plaintiffs initially to assume the costs of maintaining a suit in a foreign
jurisdiction may preclude them from enforcing small claims. The profit-
able right which corporations enjoy by interstate distribution of their
products should give rise to a corresponding duty to defend suits involving
those products wherever they are circulated in the ordinary course of
business. Therefore, Montana courts should not limit themselves to juris-
diction over those foreign corporations evincing a specific intent to dis-
tribute products in Montana. Rather, the general intent to conduct busi-
ness on the interstate level, from which introduction of products into
Montana can be foreseen, should be the criterion. The instant case should
be recognized as authority for extending jurisdiction on the basis of
such a general intent.
BRENT REED CROMLEY
BARTER-EQUATION METHOD USED TO VALUE BLOCK OF LISTED STOCK.-In
1957 taxpayer shipping line sold ships to Moore-MeCormack Lines, Inc.
for $17,000,000. The latter issued 300,000 shares of its stock to taxpayer
as part payment of the purchase price.' The sales contract assigned a
value of $30 to the shares, although they were then selling on the New
York Stock Exchange for about $23.2 Taxpayer reported a capital gain
"7This is a variation of the hypothetical advanced in Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre
Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956), and commented upon in the instant case,
supra note 31, at 83 n.11. Such an example demonstrates the need for the rule that
each case must be decided upon its own set of facts. Bullard, supra note 31, at 82.
There are numerous variables to consider, including the extent to which the defendant
must be dealing in interstate sales, whether the plaintiff must be a resident of the
forum state (not expressly required by the Montana statute quoted in text at note
29 supra. But cf., Connecticut's statute, supra note 21), and whether the tort must
have a relation to the type of commercial activity in which the defendant is engaged.
'The remainder of the purchase price was to be paid in cash ($3,200,000) and promis-
sory notes or cash ($4,800,000), at Moore-McCormack's option. The promissory notes
actually given by Moore-McCormack were stipulated to have a fair market value equal
to their face value.
' The highest price at which Moore-McCormack stock had ever been traded on the New
York Stock Exchange was 251/4 during January and February of 1957. The price
had been as low as 17 in December of 1957, and 10% in 1960.
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on the sale based on a per-share value of $19.90. The Commissioner deter-
mined a deficiency and taxpayer appealed. The United States Tax Court
upheld a $30 valuation 3 by totalling the individual ship values listed in
the sales contract, subtracting the amount of cash and notes given to the
seller, and equating the balance with the 300,000 shares. On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. The
market value of stock may sometimes be determined by the value of the
property for which it was exchanged in an arm's length transaction.
Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 528 (2nd Cir. 1967).
The fair market value of the Moore-McCormack shares had to be
ascertained in order to compute taxpayer's capital gain. Stock market
quotations were available as evidence of this value, so the question was
whether the value could be determined by reference to the value of the
property transferred by the taxpayer, rather than to the stock market
quotations. "Fair market value" has been defined as the price at which
property will change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the facts.4 Generally, the price at which shares
are traded on the open market is the best evidence of their value. 5 Stock
exchange quotations are usually reliable indices, but they are not neces-
sarily conclusive.6 "If it is established that the value of any . . . share
of stock determined on the basis of selling or bid and asked prices . . .
does not reflect the fair market value thereof, then some reasonable
modification of such basis or other relevant facts and elements of value
are considered in determining the fair market value."'7 Factors that may
be considered are corporate assets, earnings, book value, character of the
management, and any other matter which an informed seller and an in-
formed buyer would take into account.8
'Seas Shipping Co., Inc., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1222 (1965).
4See, e.g., Willow Terrace Development Co. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 933 (3rd Cir.
1965); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962); In re Williams' Es-
tate, 256 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1958). Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1958), as amended,
T.D. 6605 (1962); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958).
510 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 59.13; 4 RABKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL
INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 52.11(1). Compare Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2
(1958), which provides in part that the 'mean between the highest and lowest quoted
selling prices on the valuation date shall be considered the fair market value per
share. .... . 1
'10 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note.5, at § 59.14.
7Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (1958). Mertens notes that while "the most frequently
employed method of valuing stock is by reference to sales of other blocks of the
same or similar stock, where such sales are not available or their validity as measures
of value are questionable, a number of other factors have been taken into considera-
tion." 10 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 59.12.
'Arc Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 295 F.2d 98, 103 (8th Cir. 1961). Mertens lists these
and other factors which the courts have looked to: The company's earnings or loss
record, the character of its management, the dividend policy, the financial condition
and balance sheet of the corporation issuing the stock, the rate the corporation pays
to borrow money, the result of its efforts to sell or borrow on its stock, and offers
for the stock. 10 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 59.12. The Internal Revenue
Service has also listed factors which might be considered. Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1
CuM. BULL. 187.
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The fair market value of stock cannot always be established with
exactness or accuracy.9 However, fair market value need not be readily
ascertainable for computation of capital gain, but only ascertainable, 0
and only in rare cases will property be deemed to have no fair market
value."
In the instant case quotations from the New York Stock Exchange
were available as evidence of the value of the Moore-McCorinack shares.
Taxpayer argued the depressing effect which the sale of an unusually
large block of stock could have on market prices would reduce the per-
share value to a figure below the stock market quotations, that is, to
$19.90 per share. Taxpayer was attempting to apply the concept known
as the "blockage" rule.
Early Treasury Department regulations stated unqualifiedly that
the size of the holdings was not relevant in determining stock value.
1 2
However, in 1937 the courts began to take the view that blockage could
be a factor,13 and the Treasury Department finally accepted this view
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.14
The "blockage" rule is not automatically applied whenever the
quantity of stock is great. 1" There is no presumption that a large block
of stock is less valuable per se.' 6 For example, a block may carry with it
control of a corporation and thus have a greater value than market price
based on day-to-day trading in small units. 7 The effect of the "block-
age" rule is thus a matter of evidence, not doctrinaire assumption.'1
The courts are reluctant to depart from the orthodox use of quoted
market prices unless persuasive evidence is produced that the market
cannot absorb the block at current market prices.' 9 It has been suggested
that the astute lawyer should present the following facts to persuade
a court that consideration of "blockage" is warranted: (1) The number
of shares of the subject company outstanding, (2) the number of shares
listed, (3) daily and weekly trading in terms of the number of shares
for a reasonable time prior to and after the valuation date, (4) price
movements, (5) the trading value as related to the amount listed and
OArc. Realty Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 8, at 103.
"0Marsack's Estate v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1961).
"Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 15; Marsack's Estate v. Commissioner, supra
note 10. Of course, if the property received has no fair market value, then there is
no taxable gain by the recipient. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
12Treas. Reg. 79 (1932); Treas. Reg. 80 (1937).
"See Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1937).
"4Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 CUM. BULL. 237; Treas. Reg. 20.2031-2(e) (1958).
"10 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 59.15.
"6Maytag v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1951); Richardson v. Helvering, 80
F.2d 548 (D.C.Cir. 1935).
"Kier v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 633 (1933) ; Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
of Baltimore, 95 F.2d 806 (4th Cir. 1938), affirming 35 B.T.A. 259 (1937). It may
also be possible that a skilled broker could obtain market prices for the block to be
valued.
"sHelvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, supra note 17.
"94 RABKIN & JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 52.11(2).
[ Vol. 28
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the number of shares being valued, and (6) the distribution of outstand-
ing shares, i. e., is the entire outstanding stock likely to be traded, or are
large blocks held by interests close to the company and are they un-
likely to be traded.20
The Tax Court in the instant case did not feel sales of 100-share lots
were indicative of the value of taxpayer's 300,000 share block, and it
held that "blockage" was not a relevant consideration if the taxpayer had
neither the need nor intention 21 to liquidate his shares.22 On the contrary,
the court felt that since the block constituted the largest individual
holdings of Moore-McCormack stock, the per-share value was greater
than the mean stock average. The Tax Court also felt the value was
enhanced by a shareholders' agreement and a memorandum of under-
standing 23 which gave the taxpayer certain collateral benefits.
Once it decided the stock quotations were not determinative of the
shares' value, the Tax Court resorted to the barter-equation method.24
There was no precedent authorizing use of this method when the prop-
erty to be valued was traded on an active market.25 The only authority
for the Tax Court's decision were cases dealing with property for which
there was little or no market, notably United States v. Davis.2 That case
concerned the purchase by a taxpayer of his wife's inchoate marital
rights by transferring stock to her for a release. The Court of Claims
had decided it could not compute capital gains because it was impossible
to ascertain the fair market value of the rights. The United States Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the transfer of appreciated property
was a taxable event. It was then faced with the dilemma of valuing the
2°Badger, Blockage as a Valuation Problem, 20 INST. ON FED. TAXATION 587 (1962).
"Provision 12 of the sales contract stated that the seller (taxpayer) "represents, war-
rants and covenants that it is acquiring the shares of Common Stock of BUYER
solely for investment and not with a view to the resale or further distribution thereof.'
Taxpayer still held the shares.
'The Tax Court's holding as to "blockage" has been termed "questionable." 4
RABKIN & JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 52.11(2). The Tax Court's approach
indicates an incorrect belief that fair market value is a subjective quality which
varies with the particular owner of the property. Instant case at 530, n.3. When
valuing stock at its valuation date the courts are necessarily measuring a hypothetical
transaction as far as the taxpayer is concerned. Even if he does not intend to sell
the stock it would not seem this should have an effect on what would have been
realized from a hypothetical sale. Nevertheless, in the instant case, Taxpayer's own
expert witness, an investment banker, testified on cross-examination that blockage
would not be a factor if there was no intention to sell the stock.
'The shareholders' agreement was made with certain principal stockholders of Moore-
McCormack. It was agreed that the parties would vote their stock to elect directors,
two of whom were to be nominated by taxpayer, and the remaining seven by a
majority of the parties to the agreement. The agreement was to continue for five
years or until taxpayer ceased to beneficially own at least 100,000 shares of stock.
The memorandum of understanding provided inter alia that Moore-McCormack would
employ certain key men of taxpayer's line, although it was not required that the
employment continue for a specific time. Also, Moore-McCormack was to continue
using the name of taxpayer's line on the ships purchased for a five year period.
"The barter-equation method equates two sides of a barter. One side is chosen and
the other is then said to equal it in value.
'Instant case at 532.
-370 U.S. 65 (1962), reversing in part, 152 Ct.C1. 805, 287 F.2d 168 (1961).
1967]
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released inchoate rights.27  The Supreme Court stated that in the absence
of a readily ascertainable value, it is acceptable to hold the value of two
properties exchanged in an arm's length transaction are either equal in
fact, or presumed to be equal.28 The Court concluded that since the
parties had dealt at arm's length while negotiating the settlement, the
value of her rights was equal to the fair market value of the shares
transferred to her by her husband.29
With this support the Tax Court in the instant case held that since
the value of the Moore-McCormack stock was not readily ascertainable,
and because the parties had dealt at arm's length, the value of the prop-
erty transferred was evidence of the value of the stock received in ex-
change. 30
There was persuasive evidence of the fair market value of the ships.
They had been appraised under the auspices of the Federal Maritime
Board as part of its standard procedure in approving such sales. These
appraisals were based on domestic market prices and were slightly higher
than those listed in the sales contract.31 This indicated the fair market
value of the ships was at least equal to their listed values in the con-
tract.
32
The Tax Court also relied on the $30 figure which the contract as-
signed to the shares. While a contract value is not necessarily determin-
ative of property's fair market value,33 it can be very persuasive evidence
'There were conflicting decisions concerning the valuation of such rights. The Third
Circuit Court in Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 695 (1942), and the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d
642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 741 (1943) had both held such transfers
were taxable events and had then measured capital gain by the difference between
the taxpayer's basis and the value of the appreciated property he had transferred
to his wife. However, in Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960), these decisions were not adopted, the Sixth Circuit
holding that although there was a taxable event, the impossibility of evaluating
the rights received precluded the finding of taxable gain.
'The Supreme Court's authority was Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United
States, 130 Ct.Cl. 166, 126 F.Supp. 184 (1954), where it was necessary to value a
10-year franchise extension. Accord: United States v. General Shoe Corporation, 282
F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), (valuation of the benefits received from contributing real
estate to an employees' retirement trust) ; International Freighting Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943), (valuation of benefits received by the con-
tribution of stock to a stock bonus plan under which stock was awarded each year
to taxpayer's outstanding employees).
"The Supreme Court recognized that it was arguable that the presumption was weak-
ened by the tensions, emotions and practical necessities surrounding divorce negotia-
tions, but it believed that once it was recognized that there had been a taxable
event, it was more consistent with the general purpose and scheme of the taxing
statutes to approximate the gain rather than ignore it altogether.
"°Seas Shipping Co., Inc., supra note 3, at 1228.
"Other sales of similar ships had grossed comparable prices.
2These contract values governed their escrow arrangement, the possibility of a force
majeure, and the removal of certain ships from the transaction at Moore-McCormack's
option.
"Carl L. Danielson, 44 T.C. 549 (1965), where it was held that the covenants not to
compete were not realistically bargained for. 5
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of true value when established by persons with adverse interests.3 4 The
evidence sustained such a finding.3 5
The Second Circuit Court approved the Tax Court's holding,36 but
warned that the barter-equation method should be used "sparingly and
with considerable caution. '37 Apparently 38 the Circuit Court would only
allow its use when: (1) The transaction is an arm's length transaction,
(2) the fair market value of the property transferred by the seller can
be persuasively established, and (3) the fair market value of the prop-
erty received cannot be "readily" ascertained. 39
The instant case marks the first time the barter-equation method
has been employed to value property traded on an open market. Section
1001 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 states that capital gain
is to be measured by the fair market value of the property received.40
The Sixth Circuit Court in the Marshman decision 41 felt this could not be
accomplished by valuing the property transferred by the taxpayer in
exchange for the property received. However, it is quite possible that in
some instances the value of the property transferred will furnish the
best evidence of the value of the property received, and section 1001 (b)
would not preclude use of the barter-equation method in such cases.42
As the Circuit Court noted in the instant case, there are inherent
dangers in evaluating one side of a barter by determining what the other
side is worth. 43 The two sides are not necessarily equal and there is
usually no logical reason for starting with one side rather than the
other.4 4 There may not be persuasive evidence of the value of the prop-
erty on either side of the barter. Also, a complex evaluation problem
could arise where, as in the instant case, the consideration moving from
the seller became part of the buyer's assets, and by the transaction, the
seller became part owner of those assets.
"Ullman v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959), affirming 29 T.C. 129 (1957).
Seas Shipping Co., Inc., supra note 3, at 1228.
'In order for the 2nd Circuit Court to have disturbed the Tax Court's conclusion
in the instant case, it must be shown that the Tax Court's decision was clearly
erroneous. Maytag v. Commissioner, supra note 16, at 964.
'Instant case at 532.
"The Circuit Court said the barter-equation method should be used only under "certain
limited conditions." Instant case at 529. The Court did not specify what those
conditions might be. However, at page 532 of the instant case the Circuit Court
noted that conditions existed which made it feasible to use the barter-equation
method, and mentioned that persuasive evidence of an arm's length transaction and
of the value of the ships (the property transferred) was available. The Tax Court
applied the method because there was no "readily" ascertainable value for the shares,
and this was not overruled by the Circuit Court.
"The Tax Court felt there was no "readily" ascertainable value for the Moore-
M eCormack shares because the Stock Exchange quotations did not reflect many
aspects of the transaction. See supra note 23.
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1001(b).
'See supra note 27.
"See supra notes 26 and 28.
OInstant case at 529-30.
"Thus, in the instant case the Tax Court could have started with the stock exchange
quotations and equated the ships with those figures to determine what the ships were
worth.
1967]
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Normally, if value is not "readily" ascertainable from market quo-
tations or the like, modifications can be made45 and other factors con-
sidered. 46  The Tax Court's language in the instant case could be inter-
preted as allowing use of the barter-equation method whenever value is
not "readily" ascertainable. 47 However, heretofore the method had only
been applied where the circumstances prohibited use of any other means.
For example, the Davis case first used the word "readily" from which the
above implication could arise.48  It was actually impossible to value the
marital rights in that case by means other than barter-equation. 49 Thus,
the Davis case and the prior cases5 ° indicate that only when a valuation
problem is extremely difficult, if not impossible, should a court resort to
the barter-equation approach.
The instant case does not deviate from the above norm, despite the
fact that active trading offered some evidence of the stock's value. Stock
market quotations are not always conclusive, 5' and when, as in the instant
case, they cannot provide the court with an accurate fair market value,
there is nothing which would preclude use of the barter-equation method.
It should be remembered, however, that the method does have inherent
infirmities.52 Therefore, before it is employed a court should be faced with
a very difficult, if not impossible, valuation problem, and persuasive evi-
dence of the value of the property transferred and the presence of an
arm's length transaction should be available. Under this rule the barter-
equation method would be applied only when there was a real possibility
that (1) it could supply a valid fair market value which the standard
procedure could not provide, or (2) a taxable gain might otherwise be
ignored because the fair market value of property received was impos-
sible to determine. This means the barter-equation method would be used
infrequently, and only when necessary, and as the Circuit Court pointed
out, it should be used "sparingly and with considerable caution. '5 3
DALE SCHWANKE
'See supra note 7.
"See supra note 8.
"7Of course, this would be true only if the other two conditions were present: (1) An
arm's length transaction (which will usually be present) and (2) persuasive evidence
of the value of the property transferred (which might not always be present).
48When it spoke of the absence of a "readily" ascertainable value the Tax Court cited
Davis as authority.
'"The Supreme Court relied upon Philadelphia Park Amusement Co., supra note 28, as
authority for the holding in Davis. In that case the barter-equation method was
applied because a franchise extension was incapable of valuation with "reasonable
accuracy'' or ''reasonable certainty.''
wSee supra notes 26 and 28.
51See supra note 6.
5See supra note 43.
68See supra note 37.
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